Posted by
rycK on Tuesday, March 09, 2010 10:26:07 AM
Krugman Searches for
His Own Truth in an Irish Mirror. He Reflects upon the Mirror and Finds Himself
as Originator of the Eternal Solution. Tax and Spend.
Abstract: Paul Krugman peers
into his Irish Mirror and sees only his stale, leftist socialism. Continually
scrubbing the mirror for clarity and advice the only visible words that appear
are ‘more government’, ‘more spending ‘and higher taxes.’ Krugman is able to
show by comparison and other feats of logic that borrows heavily from Conan
Doyle that Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Community
Reinvestment Act were in no way responsible for the crash of the real estate
asset bubble as Ireland does not have there wonders. It was greed and the lack of
regulations. Krugman didn’t need a mirror to write this piece; he didn’t even
need a newspaper.
Propaganda
pieces frequently begin with a conundrum and announce the urgent need for the quest
for the ‘facts’ so the guilty can readily be identified. This is the best
opportunity to convince the mentally disnimble, the political zombies and the
cognitively marginalized of an intrinsic truth buried in the original fog. The
political truth, at least, can be delineated; we don’t know what happened, although
it must have been the fault of the opposition. The opening paragraph of this
current splash of leftist cant from the New York Times squirts great honors upon
the eternal monument their infamous Pulitzer Prize winner Walter Duranty and is of interest in this respect. Duranty’s
were the best of times for the leftist print media. Here we read that the hard
facts about financial crises are largely unknown but we can easily surge to the
left with the [absurd] notion that our 10 trillion dollar housing asset bubble
was not caused by lending to
uncreditworthy persons and that the banks were not forced to make bad loans. The culprits, then, following the
Doyle Logic, must have been the Republicans.
"How often have I said to you that when you have
eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?—Sherlock Holmes.
Krugman begins to work this elegant theorem into his little piece:
“Everyone has a theory about the financial
crisis. These theories range from the absurd to the plausible — from claims
that liberal Democrats somehow forced banks to lend to the undeserving poor (even
though Republicans controlled Congress) to the belief that exotic financial
instruments fostered confusion and fraud. But what do we really know?”—
An Irish Mirror By Paul Krugman Op-Ed Columnist Published: March
7, 2010 [Emphasis is mine in all quotes.]
His piece
meanders a while until we come to the Irish Question and only then can the
facts be clarified. They had a bubble too but without a Fannie Mae!
Negative evidence then prompts us to dig deeper and strengthen our
conclusion before the facts are understood or even identified. Peering even
further into this foggy reflection of reality, we clearly learn the hard facts
that liberal Democrats could not have
been responsible for the asset bubble as Republicans were in charge of Congress
and that charge must make us assume that in acts such as the CRA [Community
Reinvestment Act, supposedly hefting the force of
law] was somehow magically suspended during the
reign of the right. We learn new twists
and turns about the financial escapades of the right today from Paul Krugman’s acute
analysis and can now properly place blame. Actually it was Bear
Stearns in 1997 that started off this bundling or securitization of high risk
mortgages and offered to ‘the poor’ at subprime rates. With such deep thinking we can now safely wander
the financial forests and Whistle While We Work or hope that Someday My Prince [Of
Taxes] Will come to save us
But, in any good leftist saga, we need to see the truth bent
a bit:
Although
some think the banks were free to make all loans that
were not risky or unsound the actual mechanism of control of the banks was
based on this: “An institution's CRA compliance record is taken into account by the banking regulatory agencies
when the institution seeks to expand through merger, acquisition or branching.” Here is the conundrum: The Bank must avoid discrimination
in lending even when many borrowers have poor credit but somehow must comply
with CRA standards or be penalized
indirectly by regulatory agencies. Thus, banks were intimidated into make bad loans to dead beats but were offered the
chance to chuck these carcasses in some convenient latrine in return for most
of their money back and that sewer was Fannie Mae and her duller brother Freddie
Mac, now holding some 3-5 trillion dollars in toxic assets from bad debts. That is how the scheme worked. But, our hero today belies that
and looks for other reasons. We know who is to blame don’t we?
A light in the forest!
“Well, in a way the sheer scale of the crisis
— the way it affected much, though not all, of the world — is helpful,
for research if
nothing else.”— An Irish Mirror By Paul Krugman
A big event is useful? In what
way?
“We can also look at countries whose
financial institutions and policies seemed very different from those in the United States, yet which cracked up just as badly, and try to discern common
causes.”— An
Irish Mirror By Paul Krugman
Now, we
drift into more fog and distorted reflections and flee from the actual vision
we see in the Mirror and we look closely at the Irish Case where they had a
similar asset bubble and search for differences. If any differences between the Irish and the US systems are to be found then
those uniquely employed by Republicans would be clearly identified as the root
cause of the problem hence reprehensible. The theory slips here as there were
many nations that suffered during this global asset bubble, but we can draw
general conclusions from only one of these comparison cases if the outcome
coincides with Krugman’s
politics. Gather the apples.
The Irish Problem delineated:
“Ireland had none of the American right’s favorite villains: there was no Community Reinvestment Act, no
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. More surprising, perhaps, was the unimportance of
exotic finance: Ireland’s bust wasn’t a tale of collateralized debt obligations and credit
default swaps; it was an old-fashioned, plain-vanilla case of excess, in which banks
made big loans to questionable borrowers, and taxpayers ended up
holding the bag.”—
An Irish Mirror By Paul Krugman
Here, we
find a second cleansing of
Fannie Mae and its obvious non involvement in massive debt gifting to the ‘poor.’
We are now clearly, unless we are slow or are Neanderthal right-wingers,
enlightened and enchanted from by the Irish Example that since there was no CRA that by inference we can conclude
that the CRA had nothing to do with the US crash! That much is now clear. Dr
Watson would be glad to hear that.
Krugman sums up:
“[1] First, there was irrational exuberance:
in both countries buyers and lenders convinced themselves that real estate
prices, although sky-high by historical standards, would continue to rise.
[2] Second, there was a huge inflow of cheap money.
[3] Third, key players had an incentive to take big risks, because it was
heads they win, tails someone else loses. In Ireland this moral hazard was largely personal: “Rogue-bank heads retired
with their large fortunes intact.” There was a lot of this in the United States, too: as Harvard’s Lucian Bebchuk and others have pointed out, top
executives at failed U.S. financial companies
received billions in “performance related” pay before their firms went
belly-up.
[4] But the most striking similarity between Ireland and America was “regulatory imprudence”: the people charged with keeping banks
safe didn’t do their jobs. In Ireland, regulators
looked the other way in part because the country was trying to
attract foreign business, in part because of cronyism: bankers and property
developers had close ties to the ruling party.”— An Irish Mirror By Paul Krugman
Do we,
again, as the tautological rut in which Krugman’s krugmanical rants flow, hear a
clarion call for more government and regulations? The proof here is that “insufficient regulation was in force” in
both Ireland and the U. S. because bank
executives made money! Maybe bank people should be civil servants! Examples of “irrational exuberance” have been around
the world since speculation in tulips and spices were fashionable in the 16th
century and way before.
For [2],
what do we need to avoid the problem? Expensive money? Interest rates at 12% or
so? When Paul Volker put those in the 1970s to help us recover from the Jimmy
Carter Malaise he received death threats. Then, we throw in
cronyism? Can we wonder about Franklin Del Ano Raines,
as head of Fannie Mae, might have been a
crook or a crony when he made a cool $90,000,000 dollars in salary and
bonuses even thought he was accused of crimes?
No, we don’t hear that about crooked minorities in the NYT. Raines was briefly in the Obama
organization until his visibility tainted the apple barrel.
The solution! More government!
“So what can we learn from the way Ireland had a U.S.-type financial crisis with very different institutions?
Mainly, that we have to focus as much on the regulators as on the regulations.
By all means, let’s limit both leverage and the use of securitization — which
were part of what Canada did right. But such measures won’t matter unless they’re enforced by
people who see it as their duty to say no to powerful banks.”— An Irish Mirror By Paul Krugman
How about
nos have ut focus quantus
quantus in tempero ut in ordination!
“That’s why we need an independent agency protecting
financial consumers — again, something Canada did right — rather than leaving
the job to agencies that have other priorities.”— An Irish Mirror By Paul
Krugman
We can
only speculate what this term independent means in the current context. This
is probably a hazy description of some new government regulatory agency of the
Van Jones sort.
The
problem with all this is the Mirror does not relay much information to us when
our propagandist peers at his own countenance and recites from memory. Krugman
always structures his misinformation pieces neatly divided with a meat ax into
left and right halves and stresses the need to emphasize any faults shown or
assumed to be part of the opposition while never
denigrating people on the left. The social mantra of ‘affordable housing’
cannot be faulted here because the intent was pure and egalitarian. Equality
must not be faulted. There is never any conclusion from this ragzine other than
more government [see here] with more spending and more control. He mumbles
about regulators doing more regulation and does not mention that our banking
system had 12,000 regulators in force at the time of the financial crisis.
Nobody was complaining about the huge taxes being paid by investment bankers in
New
York City until the collapse happened. The predictions
that Fannie Mae was about to crash and become insolvent went unheeded by
politicians and regulators alike. Maxine Waters told us we ‘don’t have problem
with FM’. Barney Frank, tells
us FM is “not financially insolvent.”
They are ‘well financed and not in trouble.”
The
Financial Crisis of 2008 was a world-wide event and the only commonality among
those who were hard hit and their banks wavered was the real estate asset
bubble that burst upon all of us and the interlocking credit default swap
system that is still in place. Places like Greece and California [financial lepers]
need such insurance against default to sell their risky junk-grade bonds. The CDOs and other instruments were holding
well until housing prices plummeted and then assets in the form of mortgages
became toxic. Krugman misses the opportunity
to tell us that if private property were outlawed
in the US the prices of homes would have
remained constant at government insistence and we would have escaped this mess.
Cuba and North Korea escaped this bubble too.
This is
the essential issue here. If a market like housing continues to rise then tax
revenues increase with the taxable value of the homes and governments are happy
to spend the proceeds. When such a market collapses, mortgage owners default
and both tax revenues and wage taxes fall in a given area such as Baltimore City. The leftist theory must be
buried somewhere that says if housing prices fall and home owners lose equity
then a magical program like TARP can
slither along and replace that lost equity and the GDP will remain stable. We have seen every conceivable and phony
mortgage assistance program scattered about here and there with the ideas that
minorities and others would have their second chance or would have the their
loans adjudicated so that their principal and interest would be lower and they
could remain in their houses. This even applied to hundreds of thousands of
illegal aliens who got mortgages with zero down and with out even jobs.
These
programs failed miserably. Krugman has been harping on this theme for a
long time.
Notice that in these test cases where the previous refinancing recidivism
rates of credit-poor people hit 70%
is apparently not evidence of a failed program!
This program doesn’t work! How
about the phony ‘jobs’
program where we spent $92,000 per job? Then we spent $24,000 per car
on the Clunker Follies and a mere $43,000 per house on the housing scam.
And, none of these had a
lasting effect. All of the money to do this was either borrowed or printed up
quickie fashion by our government. Maybe
we need a regulation body for government spending? That is something Krugman
would never propose.
Maybe Krugman’s
beliefs are not what we think. Maybe
he ‘believes’ that any scheme however
sordid, illegal or silly that puts money in the pockets of the low class and
encourages them to vote for democrats is his belief. Yet another liberal social program failed and Krugman
cannot find a solution to any social or economic program other than more
spending and taxation and bigger government. What else is new from the Wicked
Queen? How many more poised apples can our economy take before it collapses?
What is
coming if we cannot control spending is that we will, like the Irish, fall so
far into debt that we cannot recover and there is no agency like the IMF who
will or could rescue us. We face a currency collapse if we keep
printing money. The second bubble next up on deck is actually
a mixture of two simultaneously occurring bubbles: commercial real estate and consumer debt monthly in the form
of credit cards. It is difficult to believe that major banks who issue millions
of credit cards at 25% interest rates are losing money on the deal, but that is
what they now report so a contraction in this credit market is now bubbling
away and will commence.
The
bubble after that is based on the outrageous spending of borrowed or deficit
money and these expenditures may just create a green asset bubble that will eventually burst and those assets
will be worthless and accordingly bring more debt and defaults. So we keep right on spending because Paul
Krugman sees little wrong with debt service rising to 3.5%
rycK
Comments
to: ryckki@gmail.com
“Bear
Stearns made the first public securitization of Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) loans started in
1997.[6] Editorialists in some American
newspapers[7][8] and US Congressman Ron Paul[9] say the CRA loans were lent to
otherwise un-credit-worthy consumers in the name of ending discrimination,
although an analysis of actual lending patterns does not generally support this
conclusion.[10][11][12]
On June 22, 2007,
Bear Stearns pledged a collateralized loan of up to $3.2 billion to "bail
out" one of its funds, the Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Fund,
while negotiating with other banks to loan money against collateral to another
fund, the Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Enhanced Leveraged Fund.[13] The funds were invested in thinly
traded collateralized
debt obligations (CDOs)
found to be worth less than their mark-to-market value. Merrill Lynch seized $850 million worth of the
underlying collateral but only was able to auction $100 million of them. The
incident sparked concern of contagion as Bear Stearns might be forced to
liquidate its CDOs, prompting a mark-down of similar assets in other
portfolios.[14][15] Richard
A. Marin, a senior executive at Bear Stearns Asset Management
responsible for the two hedge funds, was replaced on June 29 by Jeffrey
B. Lane, a former Vice Chairman of rival investment bank, Lehman Brothers.[16]
During the
week of July 16, 2007,
Bear Stearns disclosed that the two subprime hedge funds had lost nearly all of
their value amid a rapid decline in the market for subprime mortgages.
The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 seeks to address discrimination in loans made to individuals and
businesses from low and moderate-income neighborhoods.[7] The Act mandates that all banking
institutions that receive FDIC insurance be evaluated by Federal banking
agencies to determine if the bank offers credit (in a manner consistent with
safe and sound operation as per Section 802(b) andSection 804(1))
in all communities in which they are chartered to do business in.[3] The law does not list specific
criteria for evaluating the performance of financial institutions. Rather, it
directs that the evaluation process should accommodate the situation and
context of each individual institution. Federal regulations dictate agency
conduct in evaluating a bank's compliance in five performance areas, comprising
twelve assessment factors. This examination culminates in a rating and a written
report that becomes part of the supervisory record for that bank.[8]
The law, however, emphasizes that an institution's CRA activities should
be undertaken in a safe and sound manner, and does not require institutions to
make high-risk loans that may bring losses to the institution.[3][4] An institution's CRA compliance record
is taken into account by the banking regulatory agencies when the institution
seeks to expand through merger, acquisition or branching. The law does not
mandate any other penalties for non-compliance with the CRA.[6][9]
Krugman
Offers Us Naïve Fairy Tales about Financial Disasters and the Lessons We Should
Learn from them.
““HSA
is showing high redefault rates on the early offerings,” FHFA director James Lockhart noted
in a Congressional report this week. “Performance on the February through April
offerings shows a redefault [or recidivism] rate of almost 70%, which calls into question the
program’s assumptions that borrowers have the capacity to make payments going
forward.”” -- Fannie Program Sees 70% Recidivism By Diana Golobay May 22, 2009. Fannie Program Sees 70% Recidivism By
Diana Golobay May 22, 2009. http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-fannie6-2009nov06,0,4259740.story?track=rss
The
Second Big Bubble: The Future of Commercial Real Estate. It May Be Time To Move
Out.